Note: I mostly wrote this prior to the enormous landslide election in favor of Democrats that just happened. I still think the critique here lands, since this election was more of a rejection of Trump's depravity, combined with (mostly) high quality, context-appropriate candidates run by Dems. As evidenced by the intensity of the party's internal fight over the BAAJA bill, I don't think it was indicative of a resounding affirmation of Democratic governance and policy.
The Democratic party can't seem to get its act together. No matter how badly the Trump administration messes up, or how much dissatisfaction there is with the state of our politics, the Democrats have been unable to come up with a platform that resonates with the public or addresses the real and pressing issues many Americans face. In fact, marquee Democratic projects like California's High Speed Rail have become synonymous with governmental incompetence, and Democratic strongholds, like San Francisco and New York, have become symbols of the party's inability to address costs for basic goods.
That isn't to say parts of the party haven't tried. Pundits, advocacy groups, consultants, and politicians have offered options: more economic populism, moderation on cultural issues, embrace of "abundance" or "democratic socialism." None of these proposals have stuck, and there's good reason why. The party's ability to change is constrained by a settlement between key coalition members that allowed each to get what was important to them, but that is no longer working for people in or outside the party.
This settlement, which I'll call Rainbow Everything-Bagel Capitalism, has driven costs and unpopularity up so much that it has pushed the party to a breaking point. But every proposed fix means at least one coalition member loses out, and so far each has had enough power to prevent that. So the party has been stuck. It can get to a new settlement (Abundance Populism), better suited to today's conditions. That will take a hard shove, one that nobody in the coalition is gonna like.
Coalition members and their interests
Broadly, the Democratic coalition is made up of three groups I'll shorthand as the economic elites, the cultural elites, and the service providers. (These are the groups that have the financial, cultural, or political power to influence the Democratic party's policies and brand. Suburban moms or Southern African Americans are critical to Democrats' electoral success, but they don't define the core identity, perception, and policies of the party.)
The economic elites are college-educated, metropolitan professionals. They are (philosophically) liberal in their moral disposition and neoliberal in their economic one. They have generally benefitted from the meritocratic, credentialed, technologized, financialized, and trade-liberalized economy of the last 40 years. They see themselves as educated, compassionate, and societally minded, but in a liberal way. They support civil liberties, immigration, public benefits, and the post-WW2 expert-driven institutional order. If you wanted a stereotype, they'd be the kind of people who'd have the "in this house we believe ..." yard sign. Though many are middle-to-upper middle-class white-collar professionals, this group also includes some of the upper management and executive suites of large corporations and firms, especially those in technology, law, finance, and similar industries.
Economic elites are generally Millennial or older, and include formerly middle-class professional Boomers who have become petty millionaires via asset appreciation (in both equities and real estate). The neoliberal economy and (pre-Trump) governing institutions have generally worked for them, and they're invested in their perpetuation. They have often succeeded through meritocratic advancement, support institutions run by experts, and advocate to ensure that their kids are well-positioned to succeed in them. Most are asset holders, in equities or real estate (or both), and depend on the appreciation of those assets for their quality of life. They're happy to pay taxes, but not too many taxes, since many don't see themselves as upper class, or as having the obligations that come with it.
The cultural elites are also often college-educated and metropolitan, but they are not tech PMs or big-law associates (or educated formerly hippie Boomers). They are more leftist philosophically, mostly in a cultural, identitarian way, but increasingly in an economic, socialistic way. They think of themselves as morally awakened (not using "woke" here because of the baggage) and more radical than the liberal economic elites. They generally have not benefitted as directly from the neoliberal economy. The older Millennials in this group graduated into the Great Recession and younger Zoomers graduated into COVID. They live in cities that have become increasingly expensive and work jobs where wages haven't kept up or that don't have great long-term prospects.
The cultural elites provide the activist energy to the party and fill the activist roles within its institutional ecosystem. They are the organizers and campaign staffers; they work in nonprofits, foundations, and community groups; they are artists, or the kind of lawyers who work for the Public Defender. They are skeptical of and disappointed by the current institutional order and want to change it. In the 2010s they wanted identity-inflected change (institutions renamed, identities recognized, and historical wrongs to various identity groups righted). By the early 2020s, as the economy further technologized, basic goods like housing and healthcare grew more expensive, and inequality grew, they came to want more socialistic change as well (social housing, public-only healthcare, wealth taxes on the very rich).
The service providers are government and quasi-government employees who provide the types of services supported by the two elites. They are nurses and teachers, government employees, nonprofit direct service providers, union leaders and members (though outside of public sector unions, union members are increasingly voting Republican). They vary in their educational attainment. Some have graduate degrees (like the teachers, nurses, or planners), some haven't gone to college. Some are ideological and overlap with the cultural elites, like the employees of nonprofits that interface with social policy, or younger college professors. Some are not, like members of a local plumbers' union. They mostly care about financial and political support for the work they do, which means both what they're paid for it and how widely accessible it is. Beyond compensation, they care about the terms of their work, and sustaining (and building) political power to ensure they get that support.
How interests lead to governance
The interplay of these groups and their interests over the last 20 years has led to the current governance model of the Democratic party: Rainbow Everything-Bagel Capitalism.
The Rainbow is the identity-oriented political morality the party has come to be associated with, driven by the cultural elite. Since the civil rights era the Democratic party has thought of itself as the party of conscience. In the early 2010s that conscience began changing as young, educated Democrats increasingly saw justice through an anti-oppressive, identitarian lens (rather than the liberal, civil-rights-oriented one). The traditional liberal view of judging people by the content of their character rather than the color of their skin was inverted, and identity markers were seen to confer or withhold structural privileges for unjustifiable historical reasons. The goal of this political morality was to rectify those injustices, be they racial, sexual, gender, colonial, or otherwise, and justice demanded that society and its institutions make that rectification their first priority.
As the moral energy of the party, the cultural elite began pressuring their institutional leaders to make changes that aligned with this new priority. This meant recognizing pronouns, diversifying institutional leadership, or changing more substantive aspects of their missions or values. Police shootings of Black Americans and the cultural production of identity-oriented public intellectuals gave this change salience and urgency.
Older economic-elite liberals running public and private institutions dissipated some of this moral energy with conspicuous but often symbolic or representational acts (like adding land acknowledgements to meetings, or putting a trans flag on Bud Light), but by the early 2020s it began showing up in policy, too. Whether it was local reparations proposals, the renaming of schools, or Biden's commitment to naming a woman of color to be vice president, the party increasingly supported policies driven by identitarian considerations.
The Everything-Bagel is the Democrats' policy approach that uses each policy as an opportunity to pursue the goals of every other policy, and the complex thicket of bureaucratic processes and rules that allow various parts of the coalition to protect their interests.
Service providers are centrally concerned with maintaining high levels of compensation and increasing support for the programs they staff. So they demand that public projects use a "skilled and trained" workforce, that all components of projects receiving public funding be "Made in America," and that complex environmental laws used to extract labor concessions be protected. They organize around, campaign for, and work to elect and support politicians that deliver on these priorities.
The cultural elites demand that their view of justice be recognized. They advocate for equity criteria, engagement mandates, and conspicuous community support. A city cannot merely liberalize its zoning. It also has to fund affordable housing for historically redlined groups, increase tenant protections, and increase transit frequency and subsidies.
The economic elites, especially home-owning, older professional liberals, want to ensure policy doesn't negatively impact their quality of life. So they support extensive design and environmental review, and copious procedural steps that ensure they have a veto over any outcome they dislike. This has led to zoning codes frozen in amber, and to environmental laws meant to protect against heavy pollution being weaponized to stop apartments in desirable neighborhoods.
And finally Capitalism. This is the institutional arrangement of the neoliberal information economy: free trade, free markets, free movement of people and goods, powered by an increasingly educated and elite technocratic workforce. It is a system that generates significant levels of inequality in income and wealth, but also huge tax revenues. These fund the social programs of Democratic states and fill the coffers of Democratic-aligned political campaigns and foundations. Many of the nonprofits and programs where cultural elites and service providers work are dependent on the revenue generated by it, even if they want it to change. The economic elites have benefitted from it, and have fought to maintain its core structure, with significant social programs paid for by a combination of corporate taxes and high income taxes on the very wealthy.
Together, these elements create the core of Democratic governance: a neoliberal economic order that creates significant wealth, but concentrates it in an increasingly small number of locations and hands; combined with a symbolic, identity-oriented, heavily judgmental set of cultural and policy priorities; combined with a large, complex, inefficient, and expensive government program and regulatory system, rife with veto points and largesse.
California probably best manifests this governing equilibrium, but it exists to a greater or lesser extent in pretty much all Democrat-controlled jurisdictions.
Why it's no longer working
This governing structure was tenable for a while, in places Democrats controlled. High levels of economic growth in these areas (and low interest rates) allowed increasingly expensive bills to be paid. Though performative, the land acknowledgements could be sat through. And though bad, the worst of the housing crisis was limited to a few very high-cost metros. By 2016 it wasn't working for people outside the party, and by 2024 it'd stopped working for those within.
Trump's 2016 victory was an early demonstration of how much people outside Dem strongholds didn't like it. They had experienced it as a kind of double insult, delivered first by the economic elite and then by the cultural.
The economic elite's neoliberalism treated job losses or other material hardships as a sort of acceptable price of efficiency. Lost your job to automation or outsourcing? That's a bummer, but now average welfare is higher, so it's actually good for the country. Here's a reskilling voucher. Learn to code!
That's obviously a caricature, but it's not wildly off. Given educational and geographic sorting, economic elites often had little contact with the people and communities in "flyover country" who were losing out. And unlike the nepotistic corporate elites of yesteryear, modern Democratic economic elites felt they had earned their high positions (and compensation) through their own hard work and merit. To them, the middle Americans who had lost out were labor-market competitors who hadn't played the game as well, not a class they had any special obligations to. So they condescended to them, as winners tend to do.
The second insult came from the Rainbow. Its identitarian morality labeled many of the same people as morally culpable by virtue of accidental attributes like gender or skin color. Regardless of any economic hardship they may have experienced, it was in fact they who had unfairly enjoyed societal advantage.
Not to overplay the white working class cliche, but there were a lot of people who experienced something like this. It's easy to see how a person whose job was offshored by one part of the Democratic elite, and was then told to think of themselves as inescapably bad by the other, would end up really not liking the Democratic party. Fast forward to 2024 and it wasn't just them. Black and Latino voters without college degrees, who had taken similar economic hits, swung toward Trump harder than any other group.
In the 2020s, things got bad inside the party too. Costs started biting everywhere, especially in Democratic strongholds. Basics, like housing in areas with economic opportunity, healthcare, education, and childcare, became increasingly accessible only to the upper end of even the economic elite. Low interest rates went away, but growing expenses didn't.
The Everything-Bagel approach meant public union employees and other service providers received raises tied to inflation, but housing and healthcare costs rose faster than inflation, so they still felt pinched and budgets broke (see, for example, San Francisco's $1 billion structural deficit, driven by CPI-linked raises and growing healthcare costs). And the processes, regulations, and rules have kept housing and energy from being built at anything like the scale that would start making them cheaper.
How the party could change and why it isn't
Kamala Harris' 2024 loss was the culminating demonstration that the model was broken, and the internal fights that followed have been over which of the three words to remove.
Cultural moderates (a subset of the economic elite and service providers) say cut the "Rainbow." The party should drop the heavy emphasis on cultural positions that repel swing voters, but should keep the markets, trade, and government spending. I mean, even AOC said Woke 1 was crazy.
Proponents of "Abundance" (a subset of the economic elite) advocate for removing the Everything-Bagel. They think we should remove vetoes and reduce process, build more housing and infrastructure, and judge government by what it delivers, not how much it spends.
And the populist left (a subset of the cultural elite) wants to remove the Capitalism (or at least its current distribution of ownership). They would tax wealth, expand public programs and ownership, and strengthen labor.
The problem is that removing (or even meaningfully reforming) any one of these imposes real losses on at least one part of the coalition, and so far that part has had enough power to block it. The losses are also concentrated and immediate, while the gains are spread out and come later, so the people who'd lose fight a lot harder than the people who'd win.
| Cut "Rainbow" (cultural moderates) | Cut "Everything-Bagel" (Abundance) | Cut "Capitalism" (populist left) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Economic elite | Mixed. They lose their cheap moral legitimacy, but they'd get a party that actually wins elections. | Split. Older homeowners lose their vetoes (and get density next door). Younger professionals get cheaper housing and infrastructure that works. | Biggest loser. Higher taxes, lower incomes, and less control over the institutions they run, like admissions and licensing. |
| Cultural elite | Biggest loser. They're no longer the party's moral authority, and a lot of the status and jobs built on that go away. | Loses. Advocates lose the leverage they get from process, and "the groups" lose funding and influence. Some get cheaper rent, but it's not close. | Mostly gains. They get the agenda they've been asking for, though there'd be less money for the institutions that employ them. |
| Service providers | Neutral or gains. Not much direct stake, and plenty of members would welcome it (except where they overlap with the cultural elite). | Biggest loser. Their work rules, staffing, and contracts all get scrutinized. The building trades are the exception, since they'd get more construction. | Split. Stronger labor and more public programs, but their budgets depend on a booming economy (CA and NY have big programs because they have big economies). |
So the party has done what a rational coalition manager would do: pay lip service to reform while doing very little of it. Upzone, but then historically preserve. Streamline, but add labor requirements. Moderate messaging but don't cut funding or programs. That's also why the only answer Democrats have to rising costs is "more revenue," and why their preferred source of that revenue is "the billionaires." Goods can't get cheaper, because cheaper means someone in the coalition gets less. And the billionaires are the only group small, rich, and unsympathetic enough for the Democrats to scapegoat for their problems. There are simply too many Democratic millionaires to villainize them.
A (hard) path forward
In order to get voters to support the party for its policies, it needs to bring down the cost of important goods, and respect Americans and America. Doing that requires everyone in the coalition to give something up.
The economic elite need to appreciate that the economy is a social institution, not a game that you win, and that with success comes obligation. The petty millionaires need to accept fewer restrictions on building, less hoarding of opportunity, and potentially higher taxes on their salaries. Wealthy asset holders should be expected to have even more significant obligations to their communities and country, which means more than pledging assets to foundations they control.
The cultural elite need to recognize that their moral perspective is one among many in a big and diverse country and that they don't have special access to moral truth. They must also recognize that though the country is flawed and has injustices to rectify, as citizens, they still have a civic obligation to it. The Democratic party is an essentially liberal party. If the leftward flank doesn't like that, it should form a new party.
The service providers need to appreciate that public support comes with public trust, and that with financial support come expectations of delivery. That means accepting higher levels of accountability for performance and measuring success by whether services achieve their goals, not by whether they got better funded.
You might call this program something like "Abundance Populism." The "Abundance" part is reducing the cost of important goods like housing, healthcare, and education. In some cases, that means easing restrictions on building. In other cases it means leaning into technology and innovation. The "Populism" is not populist policies like tariffs or "no tax on tips." It's structuring and messaging policy so that it actually benefits, and is seen to benefit, regular Americans. Data centers are an example. They can bring enormous benefits to communities, but they're reviled because they're seen as taking community resources for the enrichment of far-away elites. If developers would instead first understand community needs and constraints, they could fund schools, repave roads, or permanently reduce property taxes.
The highest-profile Democratic politician taking an approach like this is Zohran Mamdani. Though he'd likely describe his governance approach as "Sewer Socialism," he's shown the same focus on delivery, the same willingness to buck coalition members, and the same commitment to policies that conspicuously help "everyday" residents. He's focused on improving trash pickup and filling potholes. He retained Jessica Tisch as police commissioner, extended City of Yes's market-rate housing reforms, and sued to block a $10,000 bonus for school paraprofessionals that the City Council had passed unanimously, often to loud complaints from his leftist base. To be clear, I think he'd like to do more leftist things (like the public grocery stores and free buses) and that he's not a liberal "Abundance Populist," but he's leveraged the popularity of its themes to make a "socialist" electable and pull the party left.
The rest of the party should learn from this. But it needs the clarity about what it will deliver and the conviction to stand up to the interests it will have to say no to. If it can do those things, it'll be a model for the 21st century. If it can't, we're in for a big, ugly fight.